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ABSTRACT
The West is a decentralised market economy whose government uses
optimal taxation to provide a public good, defence. The East is a cen-
trally planned economy. Defence is a characteristic, which is an increa-
sing function of the difference between home and foreign weapon stocks.
The cooperative outcome leads to a moratorium on investment in weapons.
Two non-cooperative solutions to this dífferential game are considered.
The first is an open-loop Nash equilibrium solution, which presumes that
countries cannot condition their investment in arms on the rival's wea-
pon stock. The second is a perfect Nash equilíbrium solution, which pre-
sumes that countries can monitor foreign weapon stocks. The perfect
equilibrium solution leads to lower levels of arms and is therefore more
efficient, so that a unilateral arms treaty should allow countries to
observe their rival's weapon stocks. The perfect equilibrium solution
also gives a micro-economic foundation of the Richardson equations.
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Since Richardson [1960] introduced a dynamic model for the des-
cription of conflict over arms accumulation between two nations, several
attempts have been made to find a behavioural micro-foundation for his
equations. Brito [1972] reformulated the Richardson model as a differen-
tial game, but restricted himself to investment strategies with pre-
commitment. This means that the nations have open-loop information sets
and therefore are assumed to be unable to observe their rival's weapon
stock. Simaan and Cruz [1975] obtained a feedback (or subgame-perfect)
Nash equilibrium solution, which relies on nations being able to monitor
their rival's weapon stock. The objectives of this paper are to provide
a more satisfactory micro-economic foundation of the Ríchardson equa-
tions and to show that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium leads to
less weapon accumulation than the open-loop Nash equilibrium. A policy
conclusion would be that countries should be encouraged to observe each
other's weapon stock.
There are two countries involved in arms conflict. The West is a
decentralised market economy whose government maximises the utility of a
representative household and levies lump-sum taxes in order to finance
investment in arms. The East is a centrally planned economy. Utility
depends on consumption, leisure and defence; defence is a characteristic
which depends on the difference between home and foreign weapon stocks.
When consumption and leisure are normal goods, there is a"guns versus
butter" dilemma as more taxes lead to more weapons at the expense of
less consumption and leisure. Section 2 formulates this two-country
model. Section 3 discusses the cooperative outcome of this differential2
game and shows that this leads to a moratoríum on investment in weapons.
Section 4 gives the non-cooperatíve Nash equilibrium for the case that
countries cannot observe their rival's weapon stock. Section 5 gives the
perfect equilibrium, which corresponds to the case that countries can
monitor their rival's weapon stock. It ís shown that this leads to less
weapon accumulation and a more satisfactory micro-foundation of the
Richardson equations. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. THE "GUNS VERSUS BUTTER" DILEMMA
Consider a decentralised market economy with a representative
household, a representative firm and a government. There are no domestic
or foreign financial assets and the economy does not engage in inter-
national trade. There is no private capital accumulation, although the
government does invest in weapon stocks. There is only one domestically
produced commodity, which can be used for both consumption and ínvest-
ment purposes. The government demands goods for investment purposes, the
household supplies labour and demands goods for consumption purposes,
and the firm demands labour and supplies goods. The real wage adjusts in
order to ensure labour market equilibrium. The government finances the
provision of public goods, i.e. weapons, by means of non-distortionary
taxes and maximises the utility of the representative household.
The household maximises utility, u(c,k,d) where c,k and d denote
consumption, labour supply and defence, subject to its budget cons-
traint, 0 t c t w!t f n- T where w, n and T denote the real wage rate,
profits and lump-sum taxes, respectively. Utility is assumed to be sepa-
rable in defence. Defence itself is a characteristic (cf. Lancaster
[1966]), which is an increasing function of the own weapon stock, a, and3
a decreasing function of the foreign weapon stock, a~ : d 3 D(a,a~).
Furthermore, it is assumed that an equal increase ín both home and
foreign weapon stocks leaves the level of defence or security unaffected
~ ~
so [hat Da(a,a )~- D~(a,a )~ 0. For an interior solution, the
a
marginal rate of substitution between leisure, 1-R, and consumption
equals the real opportunity cost of leisure so that -UR~Uc a w. The firm
maximises profits, n~ f(R) - wR where f(.) is a concave production
functíon, which yields w- f'(fL). Goods market equilibrium implies
f(R.) - c t g, where g denotes the level of government spending, and the
government budget constraint is g- t. It follows that the indirec[ uti-
lity function can, without loss of generality, be written as
~
u(C(g),L(g),d) - U(g) t D(a,a )
where U' - ucC' f uRL', C' -(ucf" f uQR f ucRf')~p,
(1)
L' --(u t u f')~~ and ~ --[u f" f u ~- 2u f' f u ' 2 Rc cc c X,R cR cc(f
)]~ 0. It
will be assumed that consumption and leisure are normal goods, so that
an increase in taxes reduces consumption, leisure and thus utility
(C'~0, L'~0, U'~0). A sufficient condition for this assumption is that
utility i s also separable in consumption and leisure.
The decentralised market economy discussed sofar will be called
the West. It is engaged i n competitive arms accumulation with a command
economy, called the East. The variables i n the East are denoted by an
asterisk. The East has the same technology and preferences, but its
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
government plans c,R ang g to maximise utility, u(c ,k ,d ), subject
~ ~ ~
to the ma[erial balance condition, f(R )- c t g. Since lump-sum taxes
are non-distortionary, this yields the same indirect utility as in the
West, U(g~) f D(a~,a)-4
In order to obtain an analytical solution for the perEect equi-
librium (see Section 5), a second-order Taylor series approximation of
indirect utility is adopted:
U(g) t D(a,a~) - 6p t 91g - 2 62gZ f 93(a-a~) - 2 94(a-a~)2
- 60 - 2 92(g-g)2 - 2 04(a-a~-m)2, 92,64 ~ 0(2)
where g- 01~62 and m- 93~04 can be interpreted as the target level of
public spending and the desired lead in weapon stocks, respectively. The
assumption of normal goods implies that g~ g for all g~ 0, so that
61 t 0. If preferences are quadratic and technology is linear the appro-
ximation is exact. The value function for the West corresponding to the
problem commencing at time t is defined as
~
V(t,a,a~) - f [U(g) q- D(a,a~)] exp[-r(s-t)] ds
t
(3)
and similarly for the East, where r ís the pure rate of time preference.
~ ~
The West maximises V(O,a~,a0), where a~ and a~ are the initial weapon
stocks, subject to the laws of motion for home weapons,
a- g- da, a(0) - a~ (4)
where d is the depreciation rate, and for foreign weapons. The East
maximises its intertemporal utility subject to the laws of motion for
weapon stocks. The dilemma of "guns versus butter" is that high taxes
are required to finance a large build-up of weapons, but this necessari-
ly implies less private consumption and leisure.5
3. COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOUR
Pareto efficient outcomes for the West and the East may be found
from:
~
Max~ J{6[U(g) t D(a,a~)] f(1-B)[U(g~) f D(a~,a)J} exp(-rt)dt (5)
g,g 0
'~ ~ ~ ~ ~
subject to (4) and a- g - da , a(0) ~ a0, where 0 G 9 c 1. This
~ ~
yields -AU'(g) - a and -(1-A)U'(g )- a, so that the marginal dis-
utility of government investment in arms, i n terms of foregone consump-
tion and leisure, should equal the marginal value of weapon stocks
~
(a and a for the West and East, respectívely). However, if the marginal
disutility of government spending exceeds the marginal value of weapons,
the complementary slackness conditions say that no investment in weapons
[akes place (g - 0 if -9U'(g) ~ a). The marginal values of the weapon
stocks follow from
- ~ ~
a - (rfd)a - 9Da(a,a ) - ( 1-8)Da~(a ,a), lim exp(-rt)a(t)a(t) a 0 (6)
t~
and
-~ ~ ~ ~
a - (r-}d)a - 6Da~(a,a ) - (1-9)Da~(a ,a),
~ ~
lim exp(-rt)a (t)a (t) - 0,
t~
so that the "rental" charge plus the depreciation charge minus the capi-
tal gains term defines the user cost of weapons and should match the6
marginal utili[y of weapons to the world. If the "world peace authority"
attaches equal weights to the West and East (0 -~), it follows that
~
a(t) - a(t) - O,b~t ~ 0 and therefore g(t) z g~(t) 3 O,E1t ~ 0.1) Since
the game between the two economies is zero-sum at the margin, the coope-
rative outcome is to have a moratorium on investment in arms and to run
down weapon stocks (via wear and tear) until they have fallen to zero.
The cooperative outcome is not sustaínable, as each country has an in-
centive to deviate from a multilateral arms treaty by increasing its
security at the expense of its rival, if the desired lead in weapons is
greater than zero (í.e. 63 ~ 0). Furthermore, a moratorium on investment
in arms is seldom observed ín the real world. Hence, Sections 4 and 5
consider non-cooperative outcomes.
4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH PRE-COMMITMENT
Consider a situation where the West and East do not cooperate
and where neither country dominates the arms race, so that a Nash equi-
librium is appropriate. Many Nash equilibrium concepts have been defined
for differential games (e.g. Starr and Ho [1969a,b]). The most common
one is perhaps the open-loop Nash equilibrium solution (OLNES), whích
has been used in Brito [1972]. It presumes that the optimal investments
in arms at each point of time are only conditioned on the initial weapon
~
stocks, a0 and a0, and therefore the expected investments of the rival
do not depend on past or current weapon stocks or on past or current
1) For 81 ~ 0 the cooperative outcome is a corner solution, but for
8i - 0 the corner solution coincides with the unconstrained solutions.
To avoid corner solutions, both in this Section and in later Sectíons,
the value of 61 can be taken to be zero as this avoids outcomes with
negative weapon stocks in the unconstrained solution.investments of the country under consideration. It follows that the
OLNES requires that each country pre-commits itself to a path of invest-
ment in arms. The first-order conditions of the OLNES give rise to:
a- G(a) - da 3(afel)~e2 - da, a(o) ~ ao (8)
.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
a - G(a ) - da ~ (a tAl)I62 - da , a ( 0) ~ a0 (9)
- ,~ ~
a - (r-~d)a - Da(a,a ) - (rfd)a - 63 f 84(a-a ),
lim exp(-rt)a(t)a(t) - 0 (10)
tim
' ir ~k ik vk ik
a - (r-Fd)a - Da~(a ,a) ~ (r-f-d)a - 93 t e4(a -a),
~ ~
lim exp(-rt)a ( t)a (t) ~ 0
t tm
~
where G' --1~U "~ 0 and a(or a) denotes the marginal value to the
West ( or East) of its weapon stock. The marginal disutility of public
spending has to match the marginal value of weapons, -u'(g) z a, which
gives investment in weapons as an increasing function of i ts marginal
value, g ~ G(a). The steady state of (8)-(11) follows from
(rfd)u'(da) f Da(a,a) - 0, which gives for the approximation (2):
s(m) ~ s~(~) - da(m) - sa~`(~) ~ el -~ e(rfs) - go ~ o. (lz)
2 2
Hence, the steady-state levels of weapon stocks increase when the dis-
coun[ rate or depreciation rate decreases and when the desired lead in
weapon stocks over the rival country increases. The steady state is a8
saddlepoint, sínce there are two stable eigenvalues (-d and
2
~r -~(r-FZd) t894~92 ) associated with the backward-looking variables,
a and a~, and two unstable eigenvalues (r-fd and ~r f~(r-~2d)2-f864~62 )
~
associated with the forward-looking variables, a and a. Since (8)-(11)
is effectively a perfect-foresight system, Buíter's [1984] method of
spectral decomposition or the method of undetermined coefficients can be
used to solve it. If can be shown that the stable manifold is given by
~
a - ~082(a -a) f 93~(rid) where
- -~[r~2d - (rt2d)2f894~e2 J ~ 0,
0 0 ~
so that g~ g f ~y ( a -a). Hence, investment in weapons increases over
and above its steady-state level when foreign weapon stocks exceed home
weapons stocks. Upon substitution, one obtains:
~
a- g0 t ~y ( a -a) - da, a(0) s s0
x ~ ~ ~
a~ - 80 f ~Y (a-a ) - da , a (0) ' a0
(13)
(14)
which is a stable system as the eigenvalues associated with (13)-(14),
i.e. -d and -2~0-d, are both negative. Equations (13)-(14) can be inter-
preted as Richardson's [1960] equations: ~ is the "defence coeffi-
cient", ~Otd is the "fatigue coefficient" and g0 is the "grievance or
hatred coefficient". However, this interpretation seems inappropriate in
view of the open-loop or pre-commitment nature of the solution concept.
In the OLNES the countries cannot condition their investments on current
weapon stocks, so that g
~
~ g t ~y0(a -a) should be interpreted as a
feedback realisation of an open-loop sequence of levels of investments.9
Olsder [1977] calls (13)-(14) the "open-loop, open-eye" solution and
(8)-(11) the "open-loop, closed-eye" solutíon, but when monitoring
foreign weapon stocks is feasible the "closed-loop, open-eye" solution
(see Section 5) seems more appropriate.
Since the margínal value of Eastern (or Western) weapons to the
~
West (or East), say a~ (or a~), does not affect the OLNES, it does not
matter whether the countries can observe their own weapon stocks. This
means that the OLNES also describes the situation where each country can
monitor its own weapon stocks but not monitor foreígn weapon stocks. The
next Sectíon considers the situation where both countries can monitor
the weapon stocks of their rival.
5. PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The closed-loop Nash equilibrium solution (CLNES) allows each
country to condition its investment in weapons on the current and,
possibly, past stocks of weapons, so that each country should be able to
monitor its own as well as foreign weapon stocks. This type of informa-
[ion structure admits, among others, memory and threat strategies, so
that the CLNES set is non-unique (see Ba~ar and Olsder [1982]). However,
if the principle of subgame perfection (see Selten [1975]) is imposed,
uniqueness typically results. The resulting outcome will be called the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solution (SPNES), although Starr and Ho
(1969b] and Simaan and Cruz [1975] refer to thís outcome as the feedback
Nash equilibrium solution. An equilibrium solution is subgame-perfect,
if for each subgame the relevant part of the solution is also a Nash
equilibrium. A subgame in this context is a game over a remainder of the10
planning period, say over [t,m) rather than over [O,m). The restriction
of the solution to a subgame must be a Nash equilibrium for all
~
t E[0,~) and for all {a(t),a (t)}. Subgame perfection rules out threat
equilibria, which rely on information patterns with memory, and equi-
libria which imply future investments that are not rational to carry out
if called upon to do so in the future. It is clear that the SPNES can be
found with the aid of dynamic programming.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the West yields
g- G(Va) -(Vaf91)~62, and similarly for the East. The SPNES follows
from the following coupled system of partial differential equations:
rv-vt s U(G(Va))fD(a,a~)tVa[G(Va)-da]tV ~[G(v~`,~)-sa~] (15)
a a
rV~-Vt - U(G(V~~))fD(a~,a)-~Va(G(Va)-5a]-FV~~[G(V~~)-da~]. (16)
a a a
Although (16)-(17) can in principle be solved for the value functions,
V(t,a,a~) and V~(t,a~,a), an analytical solution is usually impossible.
However, with quadratic objective functions and linear laws of motion,
an analytical solution can be found. Hence, presume that the value func-
tions are gíven by V(t,a,a~`) a p0 }(pl,p2)(a,a~)' - ~,(a,a~)P(a,a~)' and
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
V (t,a ,a) - p0 } (pl,p2)(a ,a)' - ~(a ,a)P ( a ,a)', where P and P~ are
positive semi-definite symmetric matríces. Upon substitution of the
value functions into (15)-(16) and equating coefficients on a, a~, a2,
2
a~ and aa~, one finds
pl - pl' p2 ~ p2' P~ ~ P'
pl a (rl-d)Pl - 83 t
(91~1)Pll,e2 } (el~l}p2)P12~e2 ~ 0 (17)11
p2 -(rFó)P2 ~1- 63 }[(el~l)(P12tP22)
t Pllp2]I62 s 0
P11 - (r-Fzs)P11
}
(P11t2P12)le2 - e4 z o
P22 3 (rf2d)P22
} (P12t2P11P22)IA2
- 84 - 0
and
P12 - [r-F2df(2P11fP22)I62]P12





There are a number of solutions that satisfy the equations (19)-(21),
but only one of them ensures that the Hessians of the value functions,
-P and -P~, are negative semi-definite.l) This solution i s given by
P11 - P22 ~ -P12 - 6 [(rl-2d)02]2f129294 - ~1-(rf2d)92 ~ 0 (22)
and
P1 ' -P2 ' 82e3I[(rfd)92fP11]. (23)
It follows that g- gP t~p(a~-a) and g~ - gP t,~P(a-a~), where
~p - P11I02 ~ 0 and the steady-state levels of investments in arms are
given by
0 C g(m) - g~(~) ~ da(W) - da~(m) 3 81 t e(rt2a) f P - gP ~ g0~ (24) 2 2 11
1) For example,
P12 - -(rt28)62-P11 - -P22 - -6(r~-2d)02 t 6 [(rt2d)82]2f12B264 are two
additional solutions but neither of them satisfies trace (p2 V) ~ 0 and
det (p2 V) ~ 0.12
Upon substitution of the investment rule into (4), one obtains
. ~
a- gp f ~yp(a -a) - da, a(0) a a0 (25)
and similarly for the East. It seems appropriate to view these as a mí-
cro-economic underpinning of the Richardson's [1960] equations. In fact,
equation (25) corresponds to a"closed-loop, open-eye" solution so that
the implied information on the monitoring of the foreign weapon stock
permits a sensible interpretation in terms of defence, fatigue and grie-
vance coefficíents.
The main result is that monitoring of foreign weapon stocks
leads to less weapon stocks than in the absence of monitoring, since
g0 ~ gp ~ 0. The intuitlon behind this result is that, when one country
considers the purchase of one additional unit of weapons, it considers
the direct marginal contribution to security and welfare, da, but it
also considers the reaction of its rival. That is, it takes account of
the fact that its rival's security is worsened and therefore it will
purchase more weapons. This therefore reduces the direct marginal con-
tribution to security and welfare, Da t,yPV ~ ~ Da, instead of Da, so
a
that there is less incentive to invest in weapons than when countzies
cannot observe their rival's weapon stock. The obvious policy implica-
tion is that countries should be encouraged to monitor each other's wea-
pon stocks as this will lead to some unilateral disarmament.
Note that, when defence is a linear function of the lead in wea-
pon stocks (64 ~ 0), the defence coefficient is zero (~P - 0) and the
grievance coeffícient is independent of whether countriea can monitor
their rival's weapon stock or not (gP ~ g0), Since for this case the13
defence coefficient for the OLNES is also zero (~0 s 0), it follows that
Eor this special case the OLNES and SPNES coincide and therefore whether
countries can monitor their rival's weapon stock or not is irrelevant.
Finally, note that, when neither country attempts to establish a lead in
weapon stocks (93 - 0), both grievance coefficients are zero (gp 3 g0 ~
0). Hence, for this special case the non-cooperative outcome (either
with or without monitoring the rival's weapon stock) reduces to the coo-
perative outcome with a moratorium in weapons.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The conflict over arms accumulation between a decentralised
market economy, the West, and a centrally planned economy, the East can
be modelled as a differential game. A multilateral arms treaty leads to
a moratorium on investment in weapons. The open-loop Nash equilibrium
solution presumes that countries cannot condition their investment in
arms on the rival's weapon stock, whilst the perfect Nash equilibrium
solution presumes that countries can monitor foreign weapon stocks. The
perfect equilibríum solution leads to lower levels of arms accumulation
and is therefore more efficient. It follows that a unilateral arms
treaty should enable countries to observe their rival's weapon stocks.
The perfect equilibrium solution also gives a more satisfactory micro-
economic foundation of the Richardson equations where the desired lead
of weapons over the rival country increases the grievance coefficients,
the concavity of the defence function determines the defence coeffi-
cients and the sum of the defence coefficients and depreciation rates
gives the fatigue coefficients. It follows that the weapon stocks in-
crease proportionately to the level of weapon stocks of the rival nation14
("defence"), decrease proportionately to the economic burden of its own
weapon stock ("fatigue") and increase due to the desired weapon lead
over the rival nation ("grievance" or "hatred").15
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